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Abstract	
This	article	assesses	the	commonalities	and	divergences	between	critical	realist	criminology	
and	feminist	criminology.	Using	Roger	Matthews’	(2014)	construction	of	Critical	Realism	as	
discussed	 in	 his	 book,	Realist	 Criminology,	 the	 article	 first	 notes	 that	 critical	 realists	 have	
largely	overlooked	or	dismissed	feminist	criminology,	despite	the	potential	synergy	between	
the	 two	 perspectives.	 The	 article	 then	 identifies	 three	major	 areas	 –	 (1)	 epistemology	 and	
research	methods;	(2)	a	critique	of	essentialism;	and	(3)	commitment	to	culturally	competent	
and	client/community‐centered	interventions	–	in	which	the	perspectives	share	similarities,	
while	 distinguishing	 the	 differences	 in	 each	 area	 as	 well.	 The	 article	 concludes	 with	 an	
invitation	for	dialogue	between	critical	realists	and	feminist	criminologists.	
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Introduction	
Left	realist	criminology	is	credited	with	giving	Marxist	and	critical	criminologists,	especially	the	
‘new	criminologists’	or	Left	 idealists	of	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	a	much‐needed	wake‐up	call	by	
arguing	 that	 street	 crime	 and	 its	 effects	must	 be	 taken	 seriously	 rather	 than	 being	 cavalierly	
dismissed	or	romanticized	as	proletarian	rebellion	against	capitalist	oppression.	As	Left	realists	
pointed	out,	the	typical	street	criminal	 is	not	a	contemporary	Jean	Valjean	stealing	so	starving	
family	members	may	 eat,	 or	 a	 Robin	Hood	 seeking	 to	 redistribute	 private	 property	 from	 the	
wealthy	 to	 the	poor.	Though	most	offenders	known	to	 the	police	are	certainly	poor,	 they	also	
typically	prey	on	other	poor	people.	Individuals	living	in	low‐income	households	not	only	have	
the	 highest	 arrest	 rates,	 they	 also	 have	 the	 highest	 victimization	 rates,	 more	 than	 twice	 the	
victimization	 rate	 of	 those	 living	 in	 high‐income	 households	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Harrell	 et	 al.	
2014).	With	work	that	began	appearing	in	the	mid‐1980s,	Left	realists	such	as	Jock	Young,	John	
Lea	 (Lea	 and	 Young	 1984),	 Elliott	 Currie	 (1992)	 and	 Roger	Matthews	 (Matthews	 and	 Young	
1986;	 Young	 and	 Matthews	 1992)	 emphasized	 the	 significant	 consequences	 that	 living	 in	
disadvantaged,	 high‐crime	 neighborhoods	 had	 on	 residents.	 But,	 while	 they	 urged	
criminologists	 to	 take	 street	 crime	 seriously,	 Left	 realists	 also	 distanced	 themselves	 from	
conservative	Right	realist	crime	control	policies	 that	 favored	 ‘getting	tough’	on	offenders	with	
longer	and	harsher	prison	sentences,	the	reinstitution	of	chain	gangs,	and	militarized	policing.	
In	 fact,	 Left	 realists	 have	 expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 cost	 of	more	 sweeping	 and	 repressive	
crime	control	practices,	since	it	is	the	working	class	and	the	poor	who	bear	a	disproportionate	
burden	of	 financing	our	expensive	but	 inefficient	 legal	system,	often	 through	taxes	or	 funding	
cuts	to	social	programs	(Matthews	1987:	377).		
	
At	 about	 the	 same	 time	 that	 Left	 realists	 were	 urging	 critical	 criminologists	 to	 take	 crime	
seriously,	feminist	criminologists	were	issuing	a	similar	call,	to	criminologists	generally,	and	to	
the	‘new	criminologists’	specifically.	As	I	document	elsewhere	(Renzetti	2013),	Marxist	feminist,	
radical	 feminist,	 and	 socialist	 feminist	 criminologists	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 80s	 pointed	 out	 the	
conspicuous	 absence	 of	 an	 analysis	 of	 gender	 in	 most	 criminological	 research,	 including	 the	
research	 of	many	 critical	 criminologists.	 For	 example,	 in	The	New	Criminology,	 considered	by	
many	to	be	the	groundbreaking	book	in	critical	criminology,	authors	Taylor,	Walton	and	Young	
(1973)	completely	ignored	the	relevance	of	gender	or	the	need	to	analyze	offending	by	women	
and	 girls.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 feminists	 drew	 attention	 to	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 criminal	
victimization	and	the	vulnerability	of	women	and	girls	to	certain	crimes	such	as	sexual	assault	
and	intimate	partner	violence,	crimes	also	largely	ignored	by	critical	criminologists	(Gelsthorpe	
and	Morris	1988;	Klein	and	Kress	1976;	Naffine	1996).	Not	only	were	these	crimes	neglected	in	
mainstream	and	critical	criminological	research,	they	also	were	not	given	appropriate	attention	
by	 the	 criminal	 legal	 system,	 which	 tended	 to	 blame	 victims	 and	 leave	 perpetrators	
unaccountable	(Caringella	2008;	Hague	and	Malos	1993;	Radford	and	Russell	1992;	Schechter	
1982).	Feminist	criminologists,	 therefore,	called	on	the	discipline,	as	well	as	the	criminal	 legal	
system,	to	take	crimes	by	and	against	women	and	girls	seriously.		
	
Given	 what	 strikes	 me	 as	 an	 obvious	 compatibility	 between	 Left	 Realism	 and	 feminist	
criminology	(see	also	Carlen	1995),	it	has	been	with	some	dismay	that	I	have	watched	the	two	
perspectives	develop	more	in	parallel	than	synergistically.	To	be	sure,	there	is	a	small	group	of	
feminist	Left	realist	criminologists,	including	Walter	DeKeseredy	and	Martin	Schwartz,	who	are	
perhaps	best	known	 for	drawing	on	Left	Realism	 to	explain	 crimes	 committed	 ‘behind	closed	
doors	 by	 patriarchal,	 abusive	 men’	 (DeKeseredy	 2011:	 38)	 What	 sets	 feminist	 Left	 Realism	
apart,	as	articulated	by	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	(2010),	is	the	foregrounding	of	gender	and	an	
analysis	 of	 how	 gender	 intersects	 with	 race,	 social	 class,	 sexual	 orientation	 and	 other	 social	
locating	variables,	to	shape	both	offending	and	victimization.		
	
As	 DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 (2010)	 point	 out,	 despite	 several	 revisions,	 Left	 Realism	 has	
remained	gender	blind.	Unfortunately,	Roger	Matthews	 (2014)	 continues	 that	 tradition	 in	his	
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book,	 Realist	 Criminology.	 In	 Realist	 Criminology,	 Matthews	 first	 traces	 the	 historical	
development	of	Left	Realism	and	discusses	the	need	for	a	broadening	of	the	perspective	so	as	to	
respond	to	 ‘the	deepening	crisis	 in	criminology’	with	 ‘an	approach	that	 is	 theory‐driven	while	
being	evidence‐based’	(Matthews	2014:	29).	In	Chapters	2	and	3	of	the	book,	Matthews	lays	out	
the	 essential	 tenets	 of	 critical	 realist	 –	 the	most	 recent	 iteration	 of	 Left	 realist	 –	 theory	 and	
methodology,	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 various	 critical	 social	 scientists,	 including	 Archer	 and	
Bhaskar	 (for	 example,	 Archer	 et	 al.	 1998).	 Throughout	 the	 book,	 he	 clearly	 and	 carefully	
distinguishes	 critical	 realist	 criminology	 from	 other	 (that	 is,	 positivist,	 liberal	 and	 idealist)	
criminologies,	offering	provocative	insights	along	the	way	that	will	likely	stimulate	debate	and	
may	 ultimately	 enrich	 criminological	 theorizing	 and	 research.	 But	 although	 he	 devotes	
considerable	 space	 to	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	 Critical	 Realism	 with	 other	 criminological	
perspectives	–	indeed,	this	is	a	primary	enterprise	of	the	book	–	Matthews	discusses	‘the	impact	
of	feminist	criminology’	in	just	four	pages	(Matthews	2014:	9‐12),	largely	dismissing	it	with	the	
claim	that,	‘Over	the	last	decade	or	so	…	feminist	criminology,	like	feminism	in	general,	has	lost	
much	of	its	radical	impact	and	has	gravitated	toward	liberal	feminism,	focusing	increasingly	on	
specific	 issues	 rather	 than	engaging	 in	wider	debates	about	patriarchy	and	gender	 inequality’	
(Matthews	 2014:	 12).	 Such	 an	 assessment	 suggests	 a	 shocking	 lack	 of	 familiarity	 with	
contemporary	 feminist	 criminological	 perspectives	 in	 particular,	 and	 with	 contemporary	
feminisms	more	broadly.	In	the	pages	that	follow,	therefore,	I	will	discuss	what	I	consider	to	be	
a	 few	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 developments	 in	 feminist	 criminology	 and	 worldwide	 feminist	
movements,	 and	 identify	 the	 potential	 benefits	 to	 Critical	 Realism	 were	 critical	 realist	
criminologists	 to	 engage	 more	 collaboratively	 with	 their	 feminist	 colleagues.	 First,	 however,	
several	points	of	clarification	are	needed.		
	
The	current	state	of	feminist	criminology	
According	 to	Matthews	 (Matthews	2014:	 9),	 ‘there	 is	 some	uncertainty	 about	 exactly	what	 is	
meant	by	“feminist	criminology”’.	An	obvious	question	in	response	to	this	claim	is	uncertainty	
for	 whom?	 Although	 there	 is	 diversity	 within	 feminist	 criminology,	 and	 several	 forms	 or	
‘brands’	of	feminist	criminology	have	developed	(see	Renzetti	2013	for	a	discussion	of	several),	
I	 think	Matthews’	 assertion	would	 likely	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 to	 the	majority	 of	 feminist	 (and	
maybe	 even	 some	 nonfeminist)	 criminologists.	 Despite	 the	 diversity	 of	 feminisms	 in	
criminology,	 there	 are	 several	 general	 theoretical	 principles	 that	 form	 the	 core	 of	 feminist	
criminology.	 (1)	Gender	matters.	Gender	should	not	be	treated	simply	as	a	control	variable	 in	
criminological	 research	 because	 the	 social	world	 and	 all	 the	 institutions	 that	 comprise	 it	 are	
gendered.	 (2)	 Gender	 is	 socially	 constructed,	 and	 the	 gender	 categories	 that	 are	 created	 are	
typically	 differentially	 valued	 in	 any	 social	 setting,	 which	 results	 in	 gender	 inequality.	 (3)	
Gender	 inequality,	 though,	 intersects	 with	 other	 inequalities,	 including	 racism,	 classism,	
heterosexism,	ageism,	and	ableism,	 to	 form	a	matrix	of	oppression	(Collins	2000)	 that	 impacts	
the	 everyday	 lives	 of	 women	 and	 men,	 including	 their	 risk	 of	 criminal	 victimization	 and	
offending	and	their	treatment	as	‘clients’	or	employees	of	the	criminal	justice	system,	as	the	case	
may	be	(Burgess‐Proctor	2006).	(4)	But	feminism	is	not	just	a	theoretical	framework;	it	is	also	a	
social	 movement.	 Feminist	 criminologists	 are	 scholar‐activists,	 whose	 research	 informs	
collective	 action	 with	 the	 goals	 of	 eliminating	 gender	 oppression	 and	 other	 inequalities	 and	
promoting	 equity.	 Feminist	 criminologists	 strive	 to	 develop	 evidence‐based	 knowledge	 that	
empowers	individuals	and	groups	to	act	to	change	behaviors	and	conditions	that	are	harmful	or	
oppressive.	In	sum:		
	
…	feminist	criminology	is	a	paradigm	that	studies	and	explains	criminal	offending	
and	 victimization,	 as	 well	 as	 institutional	 responses	 to	 these	 problems	 as	
fundamentally	 gendered	 and	 that	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 the	
scientific	knowledge	we	acquire	 from	our	study	of	 these	 issues	 to	 influence	 the	
creation	 and	 implementation	of	 public	 policy	 that	will	 alleviate	oppression	 and	
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contribute	 to	 more	 equitable	 social	 relations	 and	 social	 structures.	 (Renzetti	
2013:	13)		
	
I	write	this	confident	that	 individuals	who	identify	as	feminist	criminologists	agree	with	these	
basic	principles	of	the	paradigm,	even	though	there	is	no	single,	unitary	feminist	perspective	in	
criminology;	no	one,	true	feminist	criminology.	That	many	feminist	criminologists	offer	various	
riffs	 on	 some	 or	 all	 of	 the	 tenets	 I	 have	 presented	 does	 not	 indicate,	 though,	 that	 we	 are	
uncertain	what	we	mean	by	feminist	criminology.	
	
Likewise,	 Matthews’	 assertion	 (Matthews	 2014:	 12)	 that	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 ‘feminist	
criminology,	 like	 feminism	 in	 general,	 has	 lost	much	 of	 its	 radical	 impact	 and	 has	 gravitated	
towards	liberal	feminism,	focusing	increasingly	on	specific	issues	rather	than	engaging	in	wider	
debates	about	patriarchy	and	gender	inequalities’,	would	come	as	a	surprise	to	most,	if	not	all,	
feminist	 criminologists.	 To	 be	 sure,	 many	 feminists,	 including	 feminist	 criminologists,	 have	
chosen	 to	 focus	 their	 research	 and	 activism	 on	 specific	 issues;	 addressing	 various	 forms	 of	
violence	against	women	throughout	the	world	is	one	example	of	concentrated	feminist	research	
and	 activism	 that	 has	 been	 ongoing	 for	 more	 than	 just	 the	 past	 decade.	 Nevertheless,	 this	
research	and	activism	have	largely	been	shaped	by,	and	have	taken	place	within,	the	context	of	
heated	feminist	discourses	not	only	on	patriarchy	and	gender	inequality	but	also	in	relation	to	
globalization,	 human	 rights,	 and	 international	 law,	 conflict	 and	 peacemaking	 (Barberet	 2014;	
Flavin	and	Artz	2013).	Moreover,	 the	 impact	of	 this	research	and	activism	is	measurable	(see,	
for	example,	Boba	and	Lilly	2009;	Caringella	2008;	Kenney	2013;	Renzetti	2015).	While	some	of	
the	outcomes	might	be	described	as	liberal	feminist	–	and	I	am	well	aware	that	this	branding	is	
derogatory	in	Matthews’	radical	circles	–	I	doubt	the	women,	men	and	children	who	have	been	
the	beneficiaries	care	much	about	such	labels.		
	
It	 is	true,	as	 I	(Renzetti	2013)	and	others	(for	example,	Barberet	2014)	have	pointed	out,	 that	
feminist	 criminology	 has	 not	 succeeded	 in	 transforming	 mainstream	 criminology,	 just	 as	
Matthews	 shows	 critical	 realist	 criminology	 has	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 do	 as	 well.	 But	 Matthews	
appears	 to	 be	 unaware	 of	 the	 state	 of	 contemporary	 feminist	 criminology;	much	 of	 what	 he	
presents	as	feminist	criminology	was	published	more	than	two	decades	ago.	Without	detracting	
from	 the	 contributions	 made	 by	 the	 feminist	 criminologists	 whose	 work	 he	 discusses,	 it	 is	
nonetheless	the	case	that	there	have	been	significant	developments	 in	 feminist	criminology	in	
the	intervening	years	(Barberet	2014;	Renzetti	2013).	
	
As	 I	 read	Realist	Criminology,	 I	was	 struck	by	 the	number	of	missed	opportunities	 to	 identify	
potential	connections	between	Critical	Realism	and	feminist	criminology.	On	p.	108,	Matthews	
suggests	 that	 a	 constructive	 way	 for	 overcoming	 the	 differences	 between	 theoretical	
perspectives	–	here	he	is	discussing	cultural	criminology	and	Critical	Realism	–	and	attempting	a	
successful	 linkage	 of	 the	 two	 approaches	 ‘would	 be	 to	 begin	 identifying	 some	 points	 of	
agreement	 that	 could	usefully	 be	developed’.	 In	 the	pages	 that	 follow,	 I	 adopt	 this	method	 to	
explore	some	of	the	issues	Matthews	raises	in	his	book	that	appear	ripe	for	mutually	beneficial	
dialogue	and	collaboration	between	critical	realists	and	feminist	criminologists.	
	
Feminist	criminology	and	critical	realist	criminology:	Some	common	ground	
As	I	noted	above,	based	on	my	reading	of	Realist	Criminology,	 I	see	multiple	areas	of	common	
ground	between	feminist	criminology	and	Critical	Realism.	Given	space	constraints,	however,	I	
will	 discuss	 three	 that	 I	 consider	 as	 having	 the	 greatest	 potential	 for	 cross‐fertilization	 of	
theorizing	and	research:	(1)	epistemology	and	research	methods;	(2)	a	critique	of	essentialism;	
and	 (3)	 commitment	 to	 the	 development	 of	 interventions	 that	 are,	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	
possible,	culturally	competent	and	‘client’	or	community	centered.1	I	will	discuss	each	of	these	in	
turn,	highlighting	both	the	strands	of	commonality	between	the	two	approaches	as	well	as	their	
points	of	divergence.		
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Epistemology	and	research	methods	
I	 have	 chosen	 to	 begin	 with	 epistemology	 and	 research	 methods	 because	 I	 see	 them	 as	
foundational.	They	underlie	what	we	know	and	how	we	come	to	know	it;	they	are	the	basis	of	
knowledge	construction.	I	also	begin	by	asking	readers	to	indulge	me	by	accepting	as	given	that	
feminist	criminologists	strive	for	the	‘joined	up’	approach	that	Matthews	identifies	as	necessary	
for	 a	 ‘viable	 public	 criminology’:	 an	 approach	 that	 ‘connects	 theory,	 method,	 and	 policy	 in	 a	
coherent	manner’	 (Matthews	2014:	 52).	 Given	my	 earlier	 discussion	 of	 the	 core	principles	 of	
feminist	criminology,	I	do	not	think	this	is	too	much	of	a	leap	of	faith	for	readers.	
	
In	 Chapter	 3,	 ‘The	 Problem	 of	 Method’,	 Matthews	 offers	 a	 cogent	 critique	 of	 ‘cookbook	
criminology’,	various	 forms	of	empiricism	(abstract,	 functional,	 inverted),	and	the	tendency	of	
mainstream	criminologists	to	rely	heavily	on	statistical	analyses	and	manipulation	to	determine	
causality	 with	 reference	 to	 a	 phenomenon	 of	 interest.	 He	 concludes	 that	 statistical	 analyses,	
regardless	of	the	rigor	of	the	logic	underlying	them,	are	‘primitive	tools	as	far	as	explanation	is	
concerned	 …’.	 Indeed,	 ‘sophisticated’	 statistical	 analysis	 is	 often	 used	 to	 compensate	 for	
conceptual	 weaknesses’	 (Matthews	 2014:	 62).	 Moreover,	 he	 notes,	 statistical	models,	 though	
they	 are	 frequently	 used	 to	 predict	 various	 outcomes,	 may	 fail	 miserably	 at	 predicting	 the	
direction	 of	 future	 trends.	 In	 place	 of	 traditional	 positivist	 epistemologies	 and	 methods,	
Matthews	 calls	 for	 a	 commitment	 to	 ‘naturalism	 and	 engaging	 in	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	
subjects,	since	there	is	a	need	to	establish	a	congruity	of	meaning	between	researchers	and	their	
subjects,	 combined	 with	 a	 need	 to	 understand	 their	 experiences,	 emotions	 and	 aspirations’	
(Matthews	2014:	108).	He	discusses	ethnography	as	an	example	of	such	a	naturalistic	approach	
to	data	collection.	
	
Matthews’	 critique	 of	 positivism	and	 his	 advocacy	 of	more	 naturalistic	methods	 are	 certainly	
familiar	 to	 feminist	 criminologists.	 From	 the	 outset,	 feminist	 researchers	 have	 rejected	 the	
positivist	 scientific	model	 of	 ‘establishing	mastery	over	 subjects	…	demanding	 the	 absence	 of	
feeling,	 and	 …	 enforcing	 separateness	 of	 the	 knower	 from	 the	 known,	 all	 under	 the	 guise	 of	
“objectivity”’	 (Hess	and	Ferree	1987:	13;	 see	also	Kenney	2013;	Naples	2003;	Reinharz	1992;	
Renzetti	1997).	 Instead,	 feminist	researchers	have	called	for	research	built	on	the	principle	of	
reciprocity	between	the	researcher	and	the	research	participants.	This	requires	the	researcher	
to	discard	the	traditional	research	practice	of	establishing	and	maintaining	relational	distance	
from	 study	 participants.	Notice,	 for	 example,	 that	 feminist	 researchers	 typically	 use	 the	 term	
research	participants	 rather	 than	 research	 subjects	when	 referring	 to	 people	 in	 their	 studies.	
This	 is	 much	 more	 than	 a	 semantic	 shift;	 it	 reflects	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	 feminist	 principle	 of	
reciprocity:	 research	should	not	be	something	that	 is	 ‘done	to’	 those	who	agree	to	be	studied.	
Rather,	 the	 research	 process	 establishes	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 study	
participants	in	which	participants	give	the	researcher	their	time	and	information	(that	is,	data)	
and	 the	 researcher,	 in	 turn,	 should	 give	 something	 back	 to	 those	 they	 study.	 Feminist	
participatory	 research	 designs,	 in	 which	 those	 being	 studied	 are	 actual	 collaborators	 on	 the	
project,	 exemplify	 reciprocity	 taken	 perhaps	 to	 its	 greatest	 lengths	 (see	 Jaffe,	 Berman	 and	
MacQuarrie	 2011;	 Renzetti	 1997).	 But	 reciprocity	 on	 the	 part	 of	 researchers	 may	 involve	
something	 as	 simple	 as	 engaging	 in	 self‐disclosure	 by	 answering	 personal	 questions	 that	
research	participants	may	pose	to	them;	suggesting	resources	and	other	information	that	may	
be	 helpful	 to	 specific	 study	 participants;	 or	 providing	 comfort	 when	 participants	 become	
distressed,	 given	 that	 participants	 in	 criminological	 research	 are	 often	 revealing	 private,	
sometimes	traumatic	lived	experiences	to	a	stranger	(that	is,	the	researcher)	(see	Bergen	1993;	
Campbell	2001;	Campbell	et	al.	2010;	Renzetti	and	Lee	1993).	
	
Also	in	support	of	naturalistic	inquiry,	feminist	researchers	strive	to	adopt	an	empathic	stance	
toward	 the	participants	 in	 their	 studies.	 In	practice,	 this	means	 that,	 instead	of	 imposing	pre‐
established	response	categories	or	their	own	words	or	ideas	on	research	participants,	feminist	
researchers	try	to	give	participants	a	greater	and	more	active	role	in	guiding	the	direction	of	the	
Claire	M	Renzetti:	Critical	Realism	and	Feminist	Criminology:	Shall	the	Twain	Ever	Meet?	
	
IJCJ&SD								46	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
research	 and	 attempt	 to	 understand	 the	phenomena	 they	 are	 studying	 from	 the	 participants’	
points	 of	 view;	 that	 is,	 participants’	 emotions,	 values	 and	 lived	 experiences	 (Naples	 2003;	
Renzetti	1997).	‘Emotion	work’,	most	feminist	criminologists	would	no	doubt	agree,	is	endemic	
to	research	grounded	in	feminist	epistemology	and	methods	(see	Campbell	2001;	Renzetti	and	
Lee	1993).	
	
The	 feminist	 emphasis	 on	 reciprocity	 and	 empathy	 in	 research	 obviously	 lends	 itself	 well	 to	
qualitative	 methods,	 such	 as	 ethnography,	 as	 discussed	 by	 Matthews.	 But	 feminist	
epistemological	principles	do	not	preclude	the	use	of	quantitative	methods,	 including	complex	
statistical	 analyses,	 and	 feminist	 researchers	 value	 ‘multiple	 ways	 of	 knowing’	 (Jaffee	 et	 al.	
2011).	Many	feminist	criminologists	are	perhaps	less	mistrusting	of	quantitative	methods	per	se	
than	Matthews	appears	to	be,	but	I	think	another	piece	of	common	ground	is	that	both	feminist	
criminologists	and	critical	realists	are	wary	of	how	numbers,	devoid	of	theory,	may	be	used	to	
justify	 inequality	 or	 oppression,	 or	 to	 devalue	 or	 trivialize	 a	 problem,	 particularly	 a	 problem	
that	 disproportionately	 affects	 marginalized	 groups.	 For	 instance,	 if	 the	 numbers	 aren’t	 big	
enough	 or	 the	 p	 value	 doesn’t	 reach	 statistical	 significance,	 a	 problem	 may	 be	 dismissed	 as	
minor	or	 inconsequential.	As	Jaffe	and	colleagues	(Jaffee	et	al.	2011:	1164)	point	out,	 ‘there	 is	
nothing	 inherently	 problematic	with	 quantitative	methods,	 but	 instead	 the	 problem	 lies	with	
how	 statistics	 have	 been	 used	 …’.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 the	 decision	 to	 use	 quantitative	 or	
qualitative	methods	or	a	mixed	methods	approach,	which	feminist	researchers	have	pioneered	
(see,	for	instance,	Campbell,	Patterson	and	Bybee	2011),	should	depend	on	‘the	purpose	of	the	
particular	study,	the	questions	being	asked,	and	the	type	of	change	sought’	 (Jaffee	et	al.	2011:	
1164;	see	also	Matthews	2014:	67‐70).		
	
This	last	phrase	from	Jaffe	et	al.	(2011)	also	highlights	a	point	of	convergence	between	feminist	
criminology	and	Critical	Realism;	Matthews’	emphasis	on	the	need	for	a	‘joined	up’	approach	in	
which	theory	is	tied	to	method,	and	both	are	tied	to	policy	in	a	coherent	way,	is	congruent	with	
feminist	criminology’s	commitment	to	purpose‐driven	research	(Miller	2011):	that	is,	research	
that	informs	policy	and	produces	knowledge	that	may	be	used	for	the	development	of	more	just	
and	equitable	social	 relations	and	institutions.	Matthews,	 in	fact,	 touches	on	this	commonality	
on	p.	42	when	he	notes	 that	 ‘[f]eminist	 criminologists	have	shown	the	way	 in	working	 in	and	
against	the	state	to	change	policies	on	such	issues	as	rape,	domestic	violence	and	sex	trafficking	
…	In	addition,	 feminists	have	drawn	attention	 to	 the	gendered	and	patriarchal	nature	of	 state	
institutions,	practices	and	policies	…’.	Unfortunately,	he	fails	to	elaborate	further,	even	though	
there	are	multiple	specific	cases,	both	within	a	single	country	and	cross‐nationally	(see	Barberet	
2014;	Kenney	2013;	Richie	2012),	that	he	could	use	to	not	only	flesh	out	this	point,	but	also	to	
demonstrate	 the	 compatibility	 between	 feminist	 criminology	 and	 Left	 Realism	 in	 this	 area.	
Moreover,	 these	 cases	 speak	 to	 Matthews’	 concern	 regarding	 the	 mistakes	 criminologists	
usually	 make	 when	 trying	 to	 communicate	 their	 research	 to	 non‐academic	 audiences:	 ‘The	
problem	with	a	 great	deal	of	 contemporary	 criminology	 is	 that	 it	 is	 either	not	presented	 in	 a	
way	that	makes	it	accessible	to	politicians	and	the	general	public,	or	that	the	policies	presented	
are	 less	 than	 convincing’	 (Matthews	 2014:	 27).	 Feminist	 criminologists	 and	 other	 feminist	
researchers,	particularly	those	addressing	the	problems	and	policies	Matthews	identified	on	p.	
42,	 have	 disseminated	 accessible	 research	 briefs	 and	 summaries	 of	 key	 findings,	 along	 with	
their	practice	and	policy	implications,	through	clearinghouses,	research	centers	and	researcher‐
practitioner	 partnerships	 (see,	 for	 example,	 www.vawnet.org;	 see	 also	 Jordan	 2011).	 Indeed,	
one	may	argue	that	feminists	‘have	shown	the	way’	on	this	front	as	well.		
	
A	critique	of	essentialism	
In	comparing	Critical	Realism	with	cultural	criminology,	Matthews	(2014:	108)	notes	 that	 the	
two	approaches	 share	 a	 ‘mutual	 distrust	 of	 the	overly	 rationalised	 conception	of	man	 [sic]	 in	
rational	choice	theory	…’.	Chapter	4	of	Realist	Criminology	offers	a	thorough	critique	of	rational	
choice	 theory.2	 My	 reading	 of	 the	 chapter	 brought	 to	 mind	 black	 and	 multiracial	 feminists’	
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critique	of	essentialism.	Essentialism	is	 the	assumption	that	 ‘fixed	characteristics	are	attached	
to	bodily	identities’	(Kenney	2013:	1),	such	that	all	members	of	Group	A	basically	think	and	act	
the	same,	whereas	all	members	of	Group	B,	while	thinking	and	acting	the	same	as	one	another,	
think	 and	 act	 fundamentally	 differently	 from	members	 of	Group	A.	 The	 black	 and	multiracial	
feminist	 critique	 of	 essentialism	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 what	 these	 theorists	 labeled	
‘hegemonic	 feminism’;	 that	 is,	 feminism	 that	 regards	 the	 experiences,	 attitudes	 and	 values	 of	
white,	middle‐class,	 heterosexual	women	 as	 the	normative	 standard,	 and	 foregrounds	 gender	
differences	and	gender	inequality	(specifically,	men’s	dominance	of	women),	while	downplaying	
or	 ignoring	 differences	within	 genders	 as	well	 as	 other	 subordinating	 statuses	 based	 on	 race	
and	ethnicity,	social	class,	sexual	orientation,	age	and	physical	ability	(Baca	Zinn	2012;	Collins	
2012;	Yuval‐Davis	2012).	But	 the	argument	 is	 not	 simply	 to	be	 cognizant	of	diversity;	 rather,	
one	 must	 analyze	 the	 differences	 in	 power	 that	 are	 attached	 to	 these	 diversities.	 Black	 and	
multiracial	 feminists	 emphasize	 both	 power	 relations	 embedded	 in	 socially	 constructed	
differences	 and	 how	 the	 intersection	 of	 these	 differences	 ‘mutually	 construct	 one	 another	 as	
unjust	systems	of	power’	(Collins	2012:	19);	that	is,	interlocking	hierarchies	that	operate	both	at	
the	institutional	(macro)	level	and	through	everyday	(micro)	social	interactions.		
	
Although	 the	 black	 and	 multiracial	 feminist	 critique	 of	 essentialism	 and	 the	 matrix	 of	
domination	framework	were	developed	by	feminists	of	color,	they	are	applicable	to	all	groups	of	
women	 and	 men,	 because	 everyone	 experiences	 privilege	 and	 oppression,	 advantages	 and	
disadvantages,	 resulting	 from	 intersecting	 inequalities	 (Baca	 Zinn	 and	 Thornton	 Dill	 1996;	
Burgess‐Proctor	 2006).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 no	 one	 is	 completely	 determined	 or	 controlled	 by	
these	 inequalities;	 everyone	 has	 some	 degree	 of	 agency.	 Thus,	 people’s	 simultaneously	 held	
multiple	statuses	and	identities	will	result	in	members	of	a	specific	group	facing	both	common	
and	divergent	challenges,	to	which	they	may	sometimes	respond	in	a	similar	or	unified	way,	and	
at	other	times	in	very	different	ways	(Collins	2000;	Potter	2006).		
	
Matthews’	critique	of	rational	choice	theory	points	to	the	perspective’s	erroneous	essentialism:	
	
Rational	choice	theory’s	enduring	problem,	however,	is	that	not	all	people	act	in	
the	 same	 way	 when	 placed	 in	 the	 same	 situation	 and	 exposed	 to	 the	 same	
temptations	 or	 incentives.	 To	 explain	 these	 variations	 would	 require	 an	
understanding	 of	 individual	 agency.	 Thus,	 the	 ultimate	 limitation	 of	 rational	
choice	 theory	 is	 that	 it	 is	 too	one‐dimensional	and	does	not	adequately	capture	
the	complexities	of	social	life.	People	act	out	of	habit,	jealousy,	friendship,	loyalty	
and	sympathy	as	well	as	self‐interest.	(Matthews	2014:	83)	
	
Few,	 if	 any,	 feminist	 criminologists	 would	 disagree	 with	 Matthews’	 argument.	 But	 many	
feminist	criminologists	would	extend	it,	maintaining	that,	in	addition	to	the	various	motivations	
Matthews	 has	 listed,	 one	 must	 consider	 the	 privileges	 and	 constraints	 of	 people’s	 social	
locations	and	the	power	relations	attached	to	them.	Although	elsewhere	in	the	book	Matthews	
discusses	the	significance	of	social	class	as	well	as	power,	and	the	structure	and	agency	debate,	
these	social	relations	are	presented	as	de‐gendered	and,	for	the	most	part,	de‐raced.	Even	when	
discussing	 Philippe	 Bourgois’	 (1996,	 2003)	 work,	 in	 which	 Bourgois	 himself	 emphasizes	 the	
importance	of	gender,	race	and	class	relations	in	understanding	drug	dealing,	drug	use,	violence	
and	 their	 consequences	 for	 residents	 of	 impoverished	 inner‐city	 neighborhoods,	 Matthews	
overlooks	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 intersectional	 nature	 of	 Bourgois’	 analysis	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
cultural	and	ethnographic	dimensions	of	it.3		
	
Thus,	 although	a	 critique	of	 essentialism	offers	 some	 common	ground	 for	 critical	 realists	 and	
feminist	 criminologists,	 the	 intersectional	 framework	 that	 was	 developed	 by	 black	 and	
multiracial	feminists	in	response	to	this	critique	does	not	seem	to	have	attracted	the	attention	of	
critical	realists,	or	at	least	not	Matthews.	
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Interventions	that	‘work’	
Matthews	maintains	that	 ‘interventions	are	likely	to	work	only	to	the	extent	that	they	connect	
with	 the	 sensibilities	 and	 propensities	 of	 the	 subjects	 to	whom	 they	 are	 directed’	 (Matthews	
2014:	 108).	 Like	 other	 Left	 realist	 criminologists,	 he	 decries	 the	 Right	 realist	 crime	 control	
policies	that	extol	getting	‘tough’	on	crime.	At	the	same	time,	he	is	vociferous	in	his	criticism	of	
‘radical	liberalism’	and	its	frequent	accompaniment,	‘liberal	pessimism’,	which	claims	that	crime	
is	getting	worse,	crime	control	is	getting	more	repressive,	and	there	is	little	anyone	can	do	about	
either.	The	challenge,	Matthews	correctly	states,	is	how	to	balance	criminal	justice	intervention	
against	security,	crime	control	against	vulnerability	to	victimization.		
	
Matthews	 is	 surprisingly	 sanguine	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 recent	 developments	 in	 crime	 control	
strategies.	 He	 notes	 a	 shift	 from	 reacting	 to	 crime	 through	 a	 ‘top‐down,	 state‐centered	
hierarchical	model	of	control’	to	a	greater	focus	on	preventing	crime;	responding	to	offenders	in	
more	 flexible	 and	 informal	 ways	 (for	 example,	 forms	 of	 restorative	 justice);	 and	 instituting	
‘“smarter”	 forms	 of	 regulation’	 (Matthews	 2014:	 153)	 that	 involve	 choice,	 personal	
responsibility,	self‐governance	and	greater	public	participation	 in	the	criminal	 justice	process.	
Although	he	recognizes	that	these	new	forms	of	crime	control	have	the	potential	for	negative	or	
repressive	 outcomes,	 his	 tone	 is	 unmistakably	 optimistic:	 ‘These	 increasingly	 participatory	
methods	of	governance	and	changing	forms	of	state	power	create	new	possibilities	for	engaging	
in	 progressive	practice’	 (Matthews	2014:	 153).	 And	he	 attributes,	 to	 some	degree,	 the	 recent	
‘crime	drop	and	today’s	declining	focus	on	crime	related	issues’	to	‘these	changes	in	the	culture	
of	control’	(Matthews	2014:	153).	
	
Feminist	criminologists	share	Matthews’	position	that	interventions	that	are	responsive	to	the	
needs	of	those	to	whom	they	are	directed	–	that	is,	interventions	that	are	culturally	competent	
and	 ‘client’	or	community	centered	–	are	those	most	 likely	to	produce	positive	outcomes.	As	 I	
stated	in	my	introduction,	feminist	criminologists,	 like	Left	realists,	urged	other	criminologists	
and	the	criminal	 legal	system	to	take	crime,	especially	the	violent	victimization	of	women	and	
girls,	seriously.	Their	activism	on	this	issue	resulted	in	legislative	reforms	and	changes	in	police	
and	prosecutorial	responses	to	crimes	such	as	intimate	partner	violence	and	sexual	assault,	of	
which	 Matthews	 also	 takes	 note.	 More	 recently,	 however,	 feminist	 criminologists,	 especially	
those	who	use	an	intersectional	framework,	have	identified	the	negative	consequences	of	some	
of	these	policies	and	practices,	particularly	for	communities	of	color.	Like	Matthews,	they	have	
called	for	more	flexible	and	informal,	less	hierarchal	and	punitive,	more	community‐controlled	
and	 less	 state‐controlled	 interventions	 for	 responding	 to	 at	 least	 some	 types	 of	 crime	 (for	
example,	Ptacek	2010;	Richie	2012).		
	
I	 believe,	 however,	 that	 many	 feminist	 criminologists	 would	 be	 more	 tempered	 in	 their	
optimism	regarding	some	of	Matthews’	observations.	For	 instance,	 feminist	criminologists	are	
more	circumspect	 in	 their	 interpretations	of	 the	much‐lauded	crime	drop,	 since	 the	crimes	of	
sexual	assault	and	intimate	partner	violence	to	which	women	and	girls	are	most	vulnerable	are	
notoriously	 underreported.	Moreover,	 feminist	 criminologists	 would	 likely	 balk	 at	Matthews’	
(2014:	146)	assertion	that	 ‘[c]ertain	forms	of	fear	can	be	functional,	 in	as	much	as	it	serves	to	
increase	vigilance	and	the	 taking	of	precautions.	The	opposite	of	 fear	may	not	be	 fearlessness	
but	recklessness	…’.	For	most	women,	being	vigilant	and	taking	precautions	are	a	routine	part	of	
everyday	 life.	Despite	 precautions,	 they	may	 still	 be	 victimized,	 often	 by	 someone	 they	 know	
and	 trust.	 To	 suggest	 they	 may	 not	 have	 been	 vigilant	 or	 fearful	 enough	 smacks	 of	 victim‐
blaming.	 Feminist	 criminologists	 would	 also	 scrutinize	 Matthews’	 (2014:	 146)	 claim	 of	 ‘a	
decreased	fear	of	crime	and	an	increased	sense	of	safety,’	and	ask,	‘For	whom?’.	There	is	a	large	
body	 of	 research	 documenting	 variations	 in	 fear	 of	 crime	 by	 gender,	 race,	 social	 class,	 age,	
sexual	 orientation	 and	 ability.	 Indeed,	 an	 intersectional	 analysis	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 would	 be	
helpful	before	such	sweeping	generalizations	are	made.		
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An	intersectional	analysis	would	also	likely	reveal	significant	differences	in	support	for	various	
types	 of	 interventions,	 including	 neighborhood	 watch	 programs	 and	 local	 monitoring	
committees.	Hegemonic	cultural	constructions	that	equate	dangerousness	with	black	males	may	
produce	violent,	even	lethal	outcomes	if	a	member	of	this	group	is	spotted	as	‘out	of	place’.	The	
case	of	Treyvon	Martin	immediately	comes	to	mind.	Similarly,	an	intersectional	analysis	would	
likely	show	that	in	many	communities	of	color	there	is	deep	skepticism	regarding	a	shift	from	a	
less	punitive,	state‐controlled	criminal	justice	system	to	one	characterized	by	greater	choice	and	
community	control.	Of	course,	the	deaths	of	black	men	at	the	hands	of	police	in	US	cities	such	as	
Ferguson	 (Missouri),	 New	 York,	 Chicago	 and	 Baltimore	 had	 not	 occurred	 when	 Matthews	
published	Realist	Criminology.	But	such	brutality	is	hardly	new;	it	is	simply	more	public	due	to	
video	 cameras	 and	 social	 media.	 In	 short,	 feminist	 criminologists,	 but	 particularly	 feminist	
criminologists	 who	 use	 an	 intersectional	 framework	 to	 understand	 criminal	 offending	 and	
victimization	as	well	as	responses	to	both,	may	deem	Matthews’	take	on	shifting	crime	control	
strategies	a	bit	Pollyannaish.		
	
Conclusion	
In	 his	 book,	Realist	Criminology,	 Roger	Matthews	 assesses	 the	 development	 of	 contemporary	
criminology,	 noting	 the	 current	 dominance	 of	 administrative	 criminology	 and	 liberal	
criminology,	 but	 pointing	 to	 the	 failures	 of	 both	 in	 adequately	 explaining	 and	 effectively	
responding	 to	 crime.	 He	 sees	 the	 immediate	 challenge	 to	 criminologists	 as	 developing	 ‘a	
coherent	 and	 useful	 intellectual	 and	 epistemological	 approach’	 that	 joins	 theory	 and	method,	
values	 and	policy,	 to	 construct	 a	 viable	public	 criminology	 (Matthews	2014:	26).	He	presents	
Critical	 Realism	 as	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 challenge,	 and	 throughout	 the	 book	 he	 distinguishes	
Critical	Realism	from	other	criminological	theories,	although	he	identifies	those,	such	as	cultural	
criminology,	 with	 which	 Critical	 Realism	 has	 some	 arguable	 affinity.	 Though	 feminist	
criminology	is	mentioned	for	having	made	several	contributions	to	the	discipline,	it	is	quickly	–	
and,	 I	 have	 emphasized	 in	 this	 article,	 erroneously	 –	 dismissed	 as	 having	 ‘lost	 much	 of	 its	
impetus’	and	‘radical	impact’	(Matthews	2014:	11,	12).	I	found	Matthews’	short	shrift	of	feminist	
criminology	puzzling,	since	 I	saw	potential	similarities	between	 it	and	Critical	Realism.	In	this	
article,	 therefore,	 I	 have	 identified	 three	 major	 areas	 of	 common	 ground	 between	 the	 two	
approaches:	 (1)	 epistemology	 and	 research	 methods;	 (2)	 a	 critique	 of	 essentialism;	 and	 (3)	
commitment	 to	 the	 development	 of	 interventions	 that	 are,	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 possible,	
culturally	competent	and	‘client’	or	community	centered.	I	have	pointed	to	the	similarities	of	the	
two	 perspectives	 with	 regard	 to	 each	 of	 these	 areas	 as	 well	 as	 to	 their	 differences	 or	
disagreements.	
	
In	 light	of	this	discussion,	 is	collaboration	between	critical	realists	and	feminist	criminologists	
possible?	In	my	view,	the	answer	to	this	question	depends	largely	on	critical	realists.	After	all,	it	
is	 they	 who	 have	 dismissed	 feminist	 criminology,	 not	 vice	 versa.	 In	 fact,	 some	 feminist	
criminologists	have	attempted	to	develop	a	feminist	Left	realist	criminology	in	order	to	remedy	
Critical	 Realism’s	 persistent	 gender	 blindness	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2010).	 And	 so,	 I	
conclude	this	essay	with	an	invitation	to	Roger	Matthews	and	other	critical	realists	to	join	me	
and	other	feminist	criminologists	in	a	dialogue	on	our	commonalities	and	divergences,	keeping	
in	 mind	 that	 such	 an	 endeavor	 can	 only	 be	 productive	 if	 it	 is	 entered	 into	 with	 genuine	
openness,	mutual	respect	and	a	collegial	spirit.	
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1	In looking at Matthews’ comparison of cultural criminology and Critical Realism, for instance, I see two other 
areas in his list that I think are also compatible with feminist criminology: (1) recognition that neither crime 
nor deviance is ‘reducible to individual motivation or opportunity but is created, to some extent by the modes 
of regulation directed towards it’ (2014: 108); and (2) ‘commitment to the development of a critical or radical 
criminology that problematizes notions of crime and deviance’ (2014: 108). A detailed exploration of these 
compatibilities, however, must be saved for another article.	
2	 Matthews also discusses routine activities theory, which he faults for many of the same fundamental 
weaknesses as rational choice theory, but he adopts routine activities theorists’ distinction between the two 
perspectives: rational choice theory focuses on the content of decisions, whereas routine activities theory 
examines the situational contexts that set up the various options that are the basis of the decisions. For a 
feminist critique of routine activities theory, see Schwartz and Pitts (1994).	
3	Other excellent examples of feminist criminological research utilizing an intersectional analysis include Nikki 
Jones’ (2010) Between Good and Ghetto and Jody Miller’s (2008) Getting Played.	
	
	
	
References	
Archer	M,	Bhaskar	R,	Collier	A,	Lawson	T	and	Norrie	A	(1998)	Critical	Realism:	Essential	
Readings.	London:	Routledge.	
Baca	Zinn	M	(2012)	Patricia	Hill	Collins:	Past	and	future	innovations.	Gender	&	Society	26(1):	
28‐32.	DOI:	10.1177/0891243211426873.	
Baca	Zinn	M	and	Thornton	Dill	B	(1996)	Theorizing	difference	from	multiracial	feminism.	
Feminist	Studies	22(2):	321‐331.		
Barberet	R	(2014)	Women,	Crime	and	Criminal	Justice:	A	Global	Enquiry.	London:	Routledge.	
Bergen	RK	(1993)	Interviewing	survivors	of	marital	rape:	Doing	feminist	research	on	sensitive	
topics.	In	Renzetti	CM	and	Lee	RM	(eds)	Researching	Sensitive	Topics:	197‐211.	Newbury	
Park,	California:	SAGE.	
Boba	R	and	Lilley	D	(2009)	Violence	Against	Women	Act	(VAWA)	funding:	A	nationwide	
assessment	of	effects	on	rape	and	assault.	Violence	Against	Women	15(2):	168‐185.	DOI:	
10.1177/1077801208329146.	
Bourgois	P	(1996)	In	Search	of	Respect:	Selling	Crack	in	El	Barrio.	Cambridge,	United	Kingdom:	
Cambridge	University	Press.	
Bourgois	P	(2003)	Crack	and	the	political	economy	of	social	suffering.	Addiction	Research	and	
Theory	11(1):	31‐37.	DOI:	10.1080/1606635021000021322.		
Burgess‐Proctor	A	(2006)	Intersections	of	race,	class,	gender,	and	crime:	Future	directions	for	
feminist	criminology.	Feminist	Criminology	1(1):	27‐47.	DOI:	10.1177/1557085105282899.	
Campbell	R	(2001)	Emotionally	Involved:	The	Impact	of	Researching	Rape.	London:	Routledge.	
Campbell	R,	Adams	A,	Wasco	S,	Ahrens	C	and	Sefl	T	(2010)	‘What	has	it	been	like	for	you	to	talk	
with	me	today?’	The	impact	of	participating	in	interview	research	on	rape	survivors.	Violence	
Against	Women	16(1):	253‐261.	DOI:	10.1177/1077801209353576.		
Campbell	R,	Patterson	D	and	Bybee	D	(2011)	Using	mixed	methods	to	evaluate	a	community	
intervention	for	sexual	assault	survivors:	A	methodological	tale.	Violence	Against	Women	
17(3):	376‐388.	DOI:	10.1177/1077801211398622.	
Caringella	S	(2008)	Addressing	Rape	Reform	in	Law	and	Practice.	New	York:	Columbia	University	
Press.	
Carlen	P	(1995)	Women,	crime,	feminism	and	realism.	In	Naffine	N	(ed.)	Gender,	Crime	and	
Feminism:	429‐446.	Aldershot,	UK:	Dartmouth	Publishing	Company.	
Collins	PH	(2000)	Black	Feminist	Thought,	2nd	edn.	New	York:	Routledge.	
Collins	PH	(2012)	Looking	back,	moving	ahead:	Scholarship	in	service	to	social	justice.	Gender	&	
Society	26(1):	14‐22.		
Claire	M	Renzetti:	Critical	Realism	and	Feminist	Criminology:	Shall	the	Twain	Ever	Meet?	
	
IJCJ&SD								51	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
Currie	E	(1992)	Retreatism,	minimalism,	realism:	Three	styles	of	reasoning	on	crime	and	drugs	
in	the	United	States.	In	Lowman	J	and	MacLean	B	(eds)	Realist	Criminology:	Crime	Control	and	
Policing	in	the	1990s:	88‐97.	Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press.	
DeKeseredy	W	(2011)	Contemporary	Critical	Criminology.	London:	Routledge.	
DeKeseredy	W	and	Schwartz	M	(2010)	Friedman	economic	policies,	social	exclusion,	and	crime:	
Toward	a	gendered	left	realist	subcultural	theory.	Crime,	Law	and	Social	Change	54(2):	159‐
170.	DOI:	10.1007/s10611‐010‐9251‐8.	
Flavin	J	and	Artz	L	(2013)	Understanding	women,	gender,	and	crime:	Some	historical	and	
international	developments.	In	Renzetti	CM,	Miller	S	and	Gover	A	(eds)	Routledge	
International	Handbook	of	Crime	and	Gender	Studies:	9‐35.	London:	Routledge.	
Gelsthorpe	L	and	Morris	A	(1988)	Feminism	and	criminology	in	Britain.	British	Journal	of	
Criminology	28(2):	93‐110.		
Hague	G	and	Malos	E	(1993)	Domestic	Violence:	Action	for	Change.	Cheltenham,	Gloucestershire:	
New	Clarion	Press.	
Harrell	E,	Langton	L,	Berzofsky	M,	Couzens	L	and	Smiley‐McDonald	H	(2014)	Household	Poverty	
and	Nonfatal	Violent	Victimization,	2008‐2012.	Washington,	DC:	Office	of	Justice	Programs,	
Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics,	US	Department	of	Justice.		
Hess	B	and	Ferree	M	(1987)	Introduction.	In	Hess	B	and	Ferree	M	(eds)	Analyzing	Gender:	9‐30.	
Newbury	Park,	California:	SAGE.	
Jaffe	P,	Berman	H	and	MacQuarrie	B	(2011)	A	Canadian	model	for	building	university	and	
community	partnerships:	Centre	for	Research	and	Education	on	Violence	against	Women	
and	Children.	Violence	Against	Women	17(9):	1159‐1176.	DOI:	
10.1177/1077801211419097.	
Jones	N	(2010)	Between	Good	and	Ghetto:	African	American	Girls	and	Inner‐city	Violence.	New	
Brunswick,	New	Jersey:	Rutgers	University	Press.	
Jordan	C	(2011)	Building	academic	research	centers	to	advance	research	on	violence	against	
women:	An	empirical	foundation.	Violence	Against	Women	17(9):	1123‐1136.	DOI:	
10.1177/1077801211419086.	
Kenney	S	(2013)	Gender	&	Justice:	Why	Women	in	the	Judiciary	Really	Matter.	New	York:	
Routledge.	
Klein	D	and	Kress	J	(1976)	Any	woman’s	blues:	A	critical	overview	of	women,	crime,	and	the	
criminal	justice	system.	Crime	and	Social	Justice	5(Spring/Summer):	34‐49.		
Lea	J	and	Young	J	(1984)	What	is	to	Be	Done	About	Law	and	Order?	New	York:	Penguin.	
Matthews	R	(1987)	Taking	realist	criminology	seriously.	Crime,	Law	and	Social	Change	11(4):	
371‐401.	DOI:	10.1007/BF00728740.	
Matthews	R	(2014)	Realist	Criminology.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
Matthews	R	and	Young	J	(eds)	(1986)	Confronting	Crime.	London:	SAGE.	
Miller	J	(2011)	Social	justice	work:	Purpose‐driven	social	science.	Social	Problems	58(1):	1‐20.	
DOI:	10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.1.		
Miller	J	(2008)	Getting	Played:	African	American	Girls,	Urban	Inequality,	and	Gendered	Violence.	
New	York:	New	York	University	Press.	
Naffine	N	(1996)	Feminism	and	Criminology.	Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press.	
Naples	N	(2003)	Feminism	and	Method.	New	York:	Routledge.	
Potter	H	(2006)	An	argument	for	Black	feminist	criminology:	Understanding	African	American	
women’s	experiences	with	intimate	partner	violence	using	an	integrated	approach.	Feminist	
Criminology	1(1):	106‐124.	DOI:	10.1177/1557085106286547.	
Ptacek	J	(ed.)	(2010)	Restorative	Justice	and	Violence	Against	Women.	New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press.	
Claire	M	Renzetti:	Critical	Realism	and	Feminist	Criminology:	Shall	the	Twain	Ever	Meet?	
	
IJCJ&SD								52	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(3)	
Radford	J	and	Russell	D	(1992)	Femicide:	The	Politics	of	Woman	Killing.	New	York:	Macmillan.	
Reinharz	S	(1992)	Feminist	Methods	in	Social	Research.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Renzetti	CM	(1997)	Confessions	of	a	reformed	positivist:	Feminist	participatory	research	as	
good	social	science.	In	Schwartz	MD	(ed.)	Researching	Sexual	Violence	against	Women:	141‐
143.	Thousand	Oaks,	California:	SAGE.	
Renzetti	CM	(2013)	Feminist	Criminology.	London:	Routledge.	
Renzetti	CM	(2015)	Stories	of	research	to	reality.	Social	Science	Space.	Available	at	
http://www.socialsciencespace.com/2015/06/stories‐of‐research‐to‐reality‐claire‐m‐
renzetti/	(accessed	22	February	2016)	
Renzetti	CM	and	Lee	R	(eds)	(1993)	Researching	Sensitive	Topics.	London:	SAGE.	
Richie	B	(2012)	Arrested	Justice:	Black	Women,	Violence	and	America’s	Prison	Nation.	New	York:	
New	York	University	Press.	
Schechter	S	(1982)	Women	and	Male	Violence:	The	Visions	and	Struggles	of	the	Battered	Women’s	
Movement.	Boston,	Massachusetts:	South	End	Press.	
Schwartz	M	and	Pitts	V	(1994)	Toward	a	routine	activities	theory	on	campus	sexual	assault.	
Paper	presented	at	the	Annual	Meeting	of	the	Academy	of	Criminal	Justice	Sciences:	8‐12	
March.	Chicago,	Illinois.	
Taylor	I,	Walton	P	and	Young	J	(1973)	The	New	Criminology.	New	York:	Harper	Colophone	
Books.	
Yuval‐Davis	N	(2011)	Dialogical	epistemology–An	intersectional	resistance	to	the	‘Oppression	
Olympics’.	Gender	&	Society	26(1):	46‐54.	DOI:	10.1177/0891243211427701.	
Young	J	and	Matthews	R	(eds)	(1992)	Rethinking	Criminology:	The	Realist	Debate.	London:	
SAGE.	
	
